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This study primarily examines whether investors earn positive abnormal returns from 
S-chips, firms which are based largely in China but listed on the Singapore Exchange 
(SGX).  The increasing number of Chinese firms seeking listing on SGX and the 
growing significance of their presence among listed equities make it worthwhile to 
investigate this research question.  As SGX is stepping up its efforts to attract Chinese 
listings, the results of this study are also relevant to future policy decisions. 
 
The listing of Chinese firms can enable investors to earn positive abnormal returns by 
giving them access to the phenomenal growth in China and potentially higher returns.  
However, these Chinese firms have been embroiled in a series of accounting scandals, 
which have caused their stock prices to decline and investor confidence in the capital 
markets to be undermined.  Whether investors earn positive abnormal returns from 
Chinese firms thus becomes an issue that needs to be resolved empirically. 
 
Our sample consists of all Chinese firms that listed on SGX during the ten-year period 
from 2002 to 2011.  We define abnormal returns to be the three-year cumulative 
average abnormal return that investors would have made from investing in our sample 
portfolio of Chinese firms measured against the return from investing in a portfolio of 
comparable SGX-listed local firms.  We find that the cumulative average abnormal 
return from investing in Chinese firms is significantly negative, thereby lending 
support to the conclusion that investors earn negative abnormal returns from investing 
in Chinese firms.  Using both the FTSE Straits Times Index and the FTSE ST All 
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Share Index as benchmarks for calculating the cumulative average abnormal return 
yields the same results. 
 
We also test whether our results are being driven by the anomaly of IPO long-term 
underperformance and by home bias.  Chinese firms continued to underperform the 
most recently listed local comparable firms, which suggests that our results are not 
due to the anomaly of IPO long-term underperformance.  However, there is no 
significant difference in the returns from investing in Chinese firms and from 
investing in most recently listed foreign, non-Chinese firms, which suggests that our 
results are being driven by home bias.  We should interpret this result with caution, 
though, due to the small subsample size of only twenty-eight firms. 
 
We then investigate whether the presence of a reported accounting irregularity at a 
Chinese firm is significantly related to its long-term underperformance vis-à-vis the 
above benchmarks.  We regress the sample firms’ cumulative abnormal returns 
against indicators of the presence of a reported accounting irregularity.  The 
regression results do not support the finding of a statistically significant relationship.  
This can be due to the contagion effect of an accounting irregularity or subsequent 
corporate governance improvements made by the firm after the report of the 
accounting irregularity surfaced.   
 
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence on 
the issue of whether investors earn positive abnormal returns from S-chips. 
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Over the past decade, a significant number of Chinese had firms listed on the 
Singapore Exchange.  From 2002 to 2011, one-third of the firms that listed on SGX 
are based in China.  Having raised over S$13.8 billion collectively, these firms, also 
called S-chips, accounted for one-third of the total gross proceeds from initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in the same period.  As of the end of 2011, 144, or 18 percent, of the 
total number of firms listed on SGX are Chinese, and S-chips accounted for 13 
percent of the total market capitalization of SGX.   
 
SGX was also keen to attract more Chinese firms to list here in Singapore.  In March 
2009, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) head of listings Lawrence Wong was quoted as 
saying, “Our efforts to attract foreign listings, including China listings, will continue 
in line with SGX’s Asian Gateway position to provide an international capital 
platform for Asian-centric companies seeking funding.”  (SGX remains keen on 
attracting China listings, 2009)   
 
The large number of Chinese IPOs and the sheer amount of money invested in them 
over the past decade make it worthwhile to examine the kind of returns that investors 
earn from investing in these S-chips.  As such, this paper seeks to examine whether 
investors earn positive abnormal returns from investing in Chinese firms listed on 
SGX.  
 
The Chinese economy has been growing phenomenally at double-digit rates since 
2003. (Tsang, 2010)  In 2009, China became the world’s second largest economy in 
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terms of GDP.  Within this rapidly developing economy was a large and increasingly 
affluent domestic market with plenty of business opportunities.  Chinese IPOs are in 
demand since they are able to provide investors access to these business opportunities 
and, consequently, higher returns should these opportunities pay off.   
 
However, since 2004, seventeen Chinese firms listed on SGX, or S-chips, have been 
implicated in accounting scandals that range from lack of timely disclosure of 
material information to financial fraud.  These scandals have sent stock prices of S-
chips across the board tumbling and investor confidence in the capital markets waning, 
thereby destroying value for investors.  As such, whether investors earn positive 
abnormal returns from S-chips has become an issue that needs to be resolved 
empirically.   
 
Prior studies on the returns from investing in listed Chinese companies have mostly 
focused within the Chinese financial markets.  Studies on the performance of Chinese 
firms listed outside mainland China are few.  The findings of all these prior studies 
appear to be sensitive to the issued share type, the trading venue, the sample period, 
and the performance benchmarks.  As such, their results may not apply to our 
research context.   
 
The most similar study to ours is a study by Xu (2001) wherein she examined the 
performance of H-shares, firms based in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong.  
However, the period she examined was from 1993 to 2000, the years surrounding the 
handover of Hong Kong back to China, which was characterized by market volatility 
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fueled by ever-changing investor sentiments towards China.   Her study was 
conducted in a setting unique to Hong Kong.  
 
Differences in the characteristics of H-shares and S-chips may also render Xu’s 
(2001) results inapplicable in our setting.  SGX is generally able to attract smaller 
Chinese firms to list compared to the ones that list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKSE).  S-chips have an average of S$377 million in total assets and S$140 million 
in revenues in their year of listing, while H-shares have an average of S$9,880 million 
in total assets and S$1,546 million in revenues in their year of listing.  The average 
proceeds raised by a Chinese firm listing in Hong Kong is about S$523 million, while 
the average proceeds raised by a Chinese firm listing in Singapore is S$109 million.  
SGX is also targeting mainly medium-sized companies in high-growth sectors, and 
analysts say that these companies are not necessarily the significant ones in the field.  
(Song, 2002)   
 
There is also the issue as to whether Singapore attracts second-tier Chinese companies 
who are not qualified to list on the HKSE or are simply not willing to wait in a long 
lines of companies seeking to list on the HKSE.  (Wee, 2004)  Chinese companies 
seem to prefer to list on the HKSE if they can.  Within the same sample period from 
2002 to 2011, 356 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong while only 129 Chinese firms 
listed in Singapore.   
 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no published study on the returns made by 
investors from Chinese firms listed on SGX.   
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In examining whether investors earn positive abnormal returns from investing in 
Chinese firms listed on SGX, we define abnormal return to be the incremental return 
earned by investors from investing in Chinese IPOs against returns earned from 
investing in comparable, local firms.   Our sample consists of Chinese firms that listed 
on SGX during the ten-year period from 2002 to 2011.  We measure the three-year 
cumulative average abnormal return of our portfolio of Chinese firms against a 
portfolio of local control firms matched by industry and market capitalization.  To test 
the robustness of our results, we also measure the cumulative average abnormal return 
of our portfolio against two indices, the FTSE Straits Times Index and the FTSE ST 
All Share Index, a portfolio of recently listed control firms in the same industry, and a 
portfolio of foreign control firms in the same industry.  We focus on long-term value 
or performance of up to three years after going public.  Our results show that Chinese 
firms underperformed all three benchmarks from 2002 to 2011.   
 
We go on to examine whether this underperformance can be attributed to the anomaly 
of IPO underperformance in the long term or to home bias.  Comparing the returns of 
our sample portfolio against the returns of a portfolio of the most recently listed local 
firms in the same industry confirms that our results are not being driven by the 
anomaly of IPO long-term underperformance.  The lack of significant differences 
between the return of our sample portfolio and a portfolio of the most recently listed 
foreign, non-Chinese firms suggests that our results are due to home bias; however, 




We go one step further and try to determine whether the accounting scandals are 
significantly related to the long-term underperformance of Chinese firms.  Prior 
research has mostly focused on linking accounting irregularities with their short-term 
effect on the stock prices of the implicated firms.  The period examined for each 
reported violation or restatement ranges from one to twenty days before and after the 
corporate violation or accounting restatement was made public.  I am not aware of 
any published study on the effect of corporate violations or accounting restatements 
on the long-term stock price performance of the firm.   
 
We perform an ordinary least squares regression analysis with the three-year 
cumulative abnormal return of the Chinese firm as the dependent variable and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm had been reported in the press to have 
been involved in an accounting irregularity as one of the independent variables.  The 
results do not support a statistically significant relationship, although this may be 
because of the contagion effect of the accounting scandals or subsequent 
improvements in the corporate governance of the implicated firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows.  Section 2 outlines our motivation for this 
study.  Section 3 presents the reasons why investors can earn positive or negative 
abnormal returns from Chinese firms listed on SGX.  Section 4 provides a literature 
review on the long-term stock price performance of listed Chinese firms.  Section 5 
discusses our sample and methodology.  Section 6 shows the details of our results.  
Section 7 explores the possibility of accounting scandals being significantly related to 
the underperformance of Chinese firms.  Section 8 concludes the paper. 
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2. Motivation: the increasing significance of Chinese firms on SGX 
 
The increasing significance of Chinese firms on SGX makes it worthwhile to study 
whether their investors earn positive abnormal returns from investing in them.  
Between 2002 and 2011, one-third of the firms that listed on the Singapore Exchange 
are based or conduct a majority of their business in China.  In the same period, these 
firms raised over S$13.8 billion, which is equivalent to one-third of the total gross 
proceeds from initial public offerings (IPOs).  The annual number of Chinese firms 
listing on SGX increased steadily from 2002 and peaked in 2007, when Chinese firms 
comprised 25 out of the 52 new listings.  Excluding the large IPO made by Hutchison 
Port Holdings Trust in 2011, the amount of annual gross proceeds raised by Chinese 
firms peaked in 2007 at S$2.6 billion, while the percentage of annual gross proceeds 
raised by Chinese firms peaked in 2008 at half of the total proceeds raised in IPOs 
that year.  Table 1 below shows the total number and aggregate gross proceeds of all 
IPOs on SGX each year from 2002 to 2011 and the corresponding figures for the 
subset of Chinese IPOs. 
 
Because of this whirlwind of listing activity, Chinese stocks now make up a 
significant percentage of the stocks listed on SGX.  As of December 31, 2011, 144, or 
18 percent, of the 775 listed firms are Chinese, and their total market capitalization 
stood at S$85.7 billion, which corresponds to 13 percent of the total market 





Table 1: Distribution of Initial Public Offerings in SGX by Year from 2002 to 2011 
These figures are calculated using data from Bloomberg.  No price level adjustments have been made. 




























2002 27 1,417,914 3 11.11% 18,510 1.31% 
2003 46 2,408,833 11 23.91% 368,825 15.31% 
2004 67 2,920,965 26 38.81% 899,874 30.81% 
2005 46 2,938,652 13 28.26% 457,557 15.57% 
2006 49 5,911,015 23 46.94% 1,680,743 28.43% 
2007 52 6,867,622 25 48.08% 2,629,784 38.29% 
2008 26 1,498,378 11 42.31% 752,245 50.20% 
2009 23 2,827,160 6 26.09% 207,096 7.33% 
2010 31 7,504,670 8 25.81% 619,977 8.26% 
2011 21 7,698,534 3 14.29% 6,218,666 80.78% 
Total 388 41,993,745 129 33.25% 13,853,279 32.99% 
 
Despite the increasing percentage of Chinese firms listed on SGX, the debate remains 
as to whether investors can earn positive abnormal returns from investing in them.  
On one hand, investing in Chinese firms allows investors to gain exposure to the large 
profit potential present in the rapidly developing economy of China.  On the other 
hand, Chinese firms have been embroiled in a series of corporate scandals that 
threaten to undermine investor confidence in the market.   
 
The debate on whether investors can earn positive abnormal returns from Chinese 
firms also has important implications for SGX’s growth strategy and policy decisions.  
SGX is keen to have Chinese firms list as part of its growth strategy.  As Singapore 
has a very limited number of homegrown companies with the potential for listing, 
SGX needs to attract foreign companies to list on its two boards and become a 
regional stock exchange, an “Asian Gateway to provide an international capital 
platform for Asian-centric companies seeking funding”, as part of its growth strategy.  
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(SGX remains keen on attracting China listings, 2009; The dangers of Singapore's 
grasp at overseas listings, 2011)  Chinese companies have become arguably the 
largest IPO clients in the world.  (Tsang, 2010)  SGX has also been struggling to 
attract IPOs from countries other than China and therefore has become more reliant 
on Chinese firms for growth.  (Khoo, SGX remains keen on Chinese firms, 2009)   
 
This study seeks to partially resolve that debate by providing empirical evidence on 
the performance of SGX-listed Chinese firms.  In this study, we examine the excess 
returns that investors earn from investing in these Chinese firms vis-à-vis that from 




3. Chinese firms: positive or negative abnormal returns for investors vis-à-vis 
local firms? 
 
Investors can potentially make positive or negative abnormal returns from investing in 
Chinese firms. 
 
3.1. Why investors can earn positive abnormal returns from Chinese firms vis-
à-vis local firms 
 
Investors can earn positive abnormal returns from investing in Chinese firms since 
Chinese firms offer them exposure to the phenomenal growth in China.  China has 
been enjoying double-digit annual growth in GDP since 2003 and has overtaken 
Japan in 2009 to become the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP.  There 
is no doubt that China is one of the most important developing markets.  (Tsang, 
2010)  China has been dubbed the engine of growth for Asia, if not the world.  A 
result of this rapid economic growth is a large and growing domestic market for 
goods and services that presented plenty of growth opportunities for firms based in 
China.  These firms faced profit growth potential generally larger than what could be 
expected from other developed economies that were experiencing less than 5% GDP 
growth each year.  
 
Investors in some high-profile Chinese listings had also been handsomely rewarded in 
the past.  There are investors who want to purchase Chinese stocks because they 
believe that the stock price would appreciate in the future despite not being convinced 
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of the current valuations.  They believe that the demand for the stock, which can be 
oversubscribed by 30 or 40 times, will simply drive the prices up.  (Norton, 2004)   
 
3.2. Why investors can earn negative abnormal returns from Chinese firms 
vis-à-vis local firms 
 
Investors can potentially earn significant negative abnormal returns from Chinese 
firms since many of these firms had been reported to have accounting irregularities, 
thereby undermining investor confidence in them and resulting in lower stock prices 
and negative returns.  From 2002 to 2011, there had been reported irregularities in 
seventeen Chinese firms, and the number of incidences had been increasing in the 
more recent years.  
 
Corporate scandals have plagued listed Chinese firms since the early 2000s.  These 
scandals mostly centered on alleged tax evasions, accounting fraud, and misuse of 
funds.  Despite involving in large part only Chinese firms listed on the mainland and 
the Hong Kong stock exchanges then, Chinese firms everywhere, including those 
listed on SGX, suffered from negative investor sentiments.  (Song, 2002) 
 
The first case of an SGX-listed Chinese firm being implicated of accounting 
irregularities was in October 2004.  An audit panel found accounting irregularities 
related to sales, cost of goods sold, and receivables within the books of New Lakeside 
Holdings, a manufacturer of apple juice concentrate based in China that had been 
listed then for only a few months.  (Singapore-listed New Lakeside audit panel 
uncovers financial irregularities, 2004) In the following month, Sinomem 
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Technology’s executive director, also the spouse of its founder, sold off her five 
percent stake in the company without properly disclosing the sale.  (Koh J. , 2004)  In 
the same month, China Aviation Oil shocked the market when it finally disclosed that 
it racked up losses of US$550 million in speculative oil derivatives trading; the 
company had been involved in speculative derivatives trading since 2003 but failed to 
disclose its losses promptly.  (Singapore's China Aviation: US550M in derivatives 
losses, 2004) 
 
In 2006, another two Chinese companies were reported to have accounting 
irregularities.  Bio-Treat Technology Ltd reported an “accounting error” which 
rendered “material differences in the revenue and cost of sales items” and therefore 
restated its previously released financial statements.  (Singapore-listed Bio-Treat 
restates 2006 revenue due to accounting error, 2006) China Food Industries 
announced additional provisions for doubtful receivables following a special audit 
wherein its auditor found falsified accounts at two of its subsidiaries.  (Singapore-
listed China Food lower on additional provisions, 2006) 
 
In 2009, five Chinese firms were reported to have financial irregularities.  Fibrechem 
Technologies delayed the announcement of its annual financial results when its 
auditor discovered irregularities during its audit of the company’s trade receivables 
and cash balances.  (FibreChem investigates questionable transactions, 2009) The 
chairman of Beauty China Holdings disclosed belatedly that he had mortgaged his 
shares in the firm and had been forced to sell them.  (Chow, 2009)  Oriental Century’s 
chairman and CEO admitted to inflating sales and cash balances at the firm while 
diverting the firm’s assets to an interested party.  (Khoo & Oh, Accounting scandal 
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rocks another S-chip, 2009) The auditor for China Sun Bio-chem Technology said 
that it could not confirm the company’s bank balances and accounts receivables and 
therefore it was unable to complete its annual audit.  (S-chip firms in big trouble, 
2009)  China Hongxing Sports disclosed a material change in its shareholdings five 
months late.  (Goh, 2009) 
 
The number of accounting scandals involving Chinese firms was highest in 2011 with 
seven incidents reported in the press.  KXD Digital Entertainment faced disciplinary 
action from SGX for failing to disclose the legal suits that it was facing, to seek 
shareholder approval for interested party transactions, and to announce that it had 
ceased business operations and had effectively become a cash company.  (Past 
Disciplinary Actions, 2011)  The auditor of Hongwei Technologies could not confirm 
the cash and bank balances of its subsidiary in China.  (Khoo, Audit woes bedevil 
China Hongxing, Hongwei, 2011) China Gaoxian Fibre Fabric Holdings’ auditor 
could not confirm the bank balances for two of its subsidiaries.  (Still Opportunities in 
Quality S-chips, 2011) Improper accounting procedures spanning the period from 
2001 to 2009 were found at Cosco Corporation’s parent company.  (Warden, 2011)  
Sino Techfibre’s auditor discovered discrepancies in the firm’s and its suppliers’ 
invoices.  (Auditors of Sino Techfibre discover discrepancies, 2011) The special 
auditors of China Milk Products Group found that payments were being made in the 
company with neither board approval nor documentation.  (S-Chips feeling the heat of 
accounting woes, 2011)  China Sky Fibre Chemical failed to properly disclose 
interested party transactions and material information on the acquisition and 




These corporate scandals dealt blow after blow to the stock prices and credibility of 
not only the implicated firms but also all other listed Chinese firms.  Chinese firms 
became characterized as having weak corporate governance and lacking in 
transparency.  Investors were left wondering whether reported financials at these 
Chinese companies were real and whether management was credible.  (Yang, 2009)  
According to UOB Kay Hian director Chan Tuck Sing, “If you buy a Chinese 
company, there is always a question mark.  The issue of governance and accounting 
transparency is always there.”  (Koh G. , 2006)  These accounting scandals have 
resulted in investor confidence in the capital markets being undermined.   
 
Investors with stakes in Chinese companies whose stock prices fell drastically or 
those that delisted or suspended the trading of their shares due to these accounting 
scandals had also rarely been able to recoup their investments.  There is very little 
anyone can do to pursue these companies’ assets, as they are all located overseas.  
(The dangers of Singapore's grasp at overseas listings, 2011)  Analysts have also been 
concerned that the returns on Singapore companies may be dragged down due to their 
exposure to Chinese companies.  (Khoo & Oh, Accounting scandal rocks another S-
chip, 2009) 
 
SGX responded to these corporate scandals by enforcing stricter regulations.  In 2004, 
amidst a flood of IPOs by Chinese firms, SGX introduced tougher disclosure rules 
and greater scrutiny of investment bankers, IPO sponsors, and IPO applicants.  (Siow, 
2004)  In 2005, SGX implemented new rules to strengthen corporate governance.  
These include the following: (1) requiring foreign companies to appoint to their board 
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a third independent director who is either a Singapore resident or an expert on 
Singapore law; (2) requiring boards to give negative assurances for quarterly results 
that say they are not aware of any circumstances that may render the results false or 
misleading; (3) requiring boards and CEOs to confirm each year that their companies 
have effective risk management systems in place; and (4) increasing the time period 
that an investment bank’s name is stated on a newly listed company’s statements to 
two years. (Prystay, 2005)  SGX again proposed new plans to tighten governance in 
2009, which include appointing chief financial officers and independent directors at 
least six months before a company submits its documents to the exchange for listing 
purposes and requiring controlling shareholders of listed companies to have their 
shares reside with the Central Depository in Singapore.  (Chen G. , 2009)  Finally, in 
2011, SGX started requiring its listed companies to disclose more information about 
their internal controls and legal representatives.  (Singapore Exchange to toughen 
corporate governance rules, 2011)  Despite the continuous tightening of rules and 
regulations, the number of reported accounting irregularities did not abate; instead, 
the costs of going public for all firms increased, potentially discouraging other good 
companies from listing and depriving investors of possibly good investment 
opportunities. 
 
It is unclear which argument is stronger, that for investors earning positive or negative 
abnormal returns from Chinese firms.  Empirical evidence is necessary for 
determining which effect dominates.   
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4. The long-term performance of Chinese initial public offerings 
 
This section reviews the literature on the long-term stock price performance of 
Chinese firms listed on stock exchanges both in and outside China.   
 
Mok and Hui (1998) conducted a study on the aftermarket performance of A-share
1
 
and B-share IPOs issued between June 1992 and December 1993 in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange.  They found that over a 350-day period after listing, underpriced A-
shares approximated the market return, while overpriced A-shares and B-shares had 
positive cumulative average excess returns when benchmarked against the appropriate 
Shanghai stock indices.  
 
Chen et al. (2000) conducted a study similar to Mok and Hui (1998).  They used a 
sample consisting of IPOs from both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
issued within the four calendar years from 1992 to 1995 and a longer aftermarket time 
window of up to three years.  Their results show that while market-adjusted returns 
from a buy-and-hold strategy are positive after the first year, they became 
significantly negative at the end of the third year for both A-shares and B-shares.  
 
Chan et al. (2004) also examined the long-term performance of IPOs in China.  They 
used a bigger sample of A-shares issued between January 1993 and December 1998 
and B-shares issued between January 1995 and December 1998.  Instead of using the 
broad stock exchange indices as benchmarks in calculating market-adjusted returns, 
                                                        
1 There are two types of stocks issued and traded in China’s stock exchanges.  “A” 
shares are issued exclusively to domestic investors and are traded in the local 
currency, while “B’ shares are issued exclusively to foreign investors primarily by 
private placement and traded in foreign currencies.   
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they used three portfolios made up of control firms matched by size, by book-to-
market ratio, and by both size and book-to-market ratio respectively to the IPOs in 
their sample.  Their results show that A-shares underperformed all three benchmark 
portfolios throughout the entire three-year aftermarket period.  On the other hand, B-
shares outperformed all three benchmark portfolios every month for three years after 
listing.  
 
Chi and Padgett (2005) found that A-shares outperformed both the Shanghai A-share 
Index and the Shenzhen A-share Index, with cumulative market-adjusted returns of 
approximately 10% at the end of three years after listing.  Their sample consists of 
409 firms that listed A-shares on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 1997.   
 
Contrary to Chi and Padgett’s (2005) results, Cai et al. (2008) found that at the end of 
the three-year aftermarket period, the 335 A-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange from 1997 to 2001 underperformed the Shanghai A-share Index by 25% in 
terms of cumulative abnormal returns and 29% in terms of buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns.   
 
Chi et al. (2010) studied the long-run stock performance of 897 A-share IPOs that 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 
1996 and 2002.  They used the Shanghai A-share Index and the Shenzhen A-share 
Index as benchmarks.  Their results show that both cumulative abnormal returns and 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are significantly positive for IPOs from 1996 to 1999 
but began to decline and became significantly negative for IPOs listed thereafter.   
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Chang et al. (2010) used a larger sample of 1,194 A-share IPOs from a longer sample 
period of 1993 to 2004.  Similar to Chan et al. (2004), they matched the sample firms 
with control firms based on size, book-to-market ratio, and both size and book-to-
market ratio to calculate buy-and-hold adjusted returns.  Consistent with Chan et al. 
(2004), their results show that over a three-year period, A-share IPOs underperformed 
all three benchmarks.   
 
Shiah-Hou (2005) focused on the performance of B-shares issued from 1992 to 1999.  
She found that for a period of 280 trading days after listing, B-shares slightly 
outperformed the portfolio of all firms from the same industry as the sample firm.  If 
the aftermarket period is extended to 560 trading days, B-shares underperformed their 
industry portfolios by a small percentage.   
 
Xu (2001) examined the characteristics and performance of H-shares, companies that 
were incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong.  She found that the 
performance of H-shares had been very volatile during the period of 1993 to 2000, 
with the dramatic ups and downs fueled by ever-changing investor sentiments towards 
China.  Foreign investors had also been deterred from investing in H-shares due to 
their “lack of financial transparency, poor management, and improper usage of funds 
in noncore businesses”.  
 
Schaub (2010) did a short study on the performance of Chinese American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the three-year 
period after listing.  He found that on average, the returns on Chinese ADRs were 
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similar to the returns of the S&P 500 Index; however, those that traded during the bull 
market underperformed the market index by over 26%, while those that traded during 
the bear market outperformed the market index by almost 40%.  
 
The findings of these studies on the long-term performance of Chinese IPOs appear to 
be sensitive to the type of shares issued, the venue on which the shares are listed and 
traded, the sample period of the study, and the benchmarks used.  As such, we cannot 
extrapolate any of these results to determine whether the listing of Chinese firms on 
SGX adds value to investors. 
  
 19 




Our sample consists of all Chinese companies with data available on Bloomberg that 
listed on the Singapore Exchange during the ten-year period from January 1, 2002 to 
December 31, 2011.  A firm is classified as Chinese if it meets any of the following 
criteria: (1) Bloomberg lists the firm’s country of domicile as China; (2) Bloomberg 
lists the firm’s ultimate parent country of risk as China; or (3) the firm is a member of 
the FTSE ST China Index, a broad China-play index.  Our sample has 127 firms and 
includes 88% of the 144 Chinese firms listed on SGX as of the end of 2011.  Our 
sample is broad-based.  There is at least one firm in each GICS sector.  The sample 
firms’ market capitalizations range from about S$2 million to S$10 billion at the end 




In determining whether Chinese IPOs add value to investors, we define value to be 
the incremental return that investors can earn from investing in Chinese firms 
compared to the returns that they can make from investing in comparable local firms 
within the same period.  We focus on value over the long run, specifically a period of 
three years from the listing date of the Chinese firm.   
 
We adopt Ritter’s (1991) methodology in comparing the long-term performance of 
IPOs versus other firms and use the following two measures: cumulative average 
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adjusted return and wealth relative.  In constructing these measures, we set the 
following as benchmarks for the performance of Chinese firms: (1) a portfolio of 
control firms matched against the sample firms based on industry and size; (2) the 
FTSE Straits Times Index, which contains the top thirty companies by market 
capitalization that is listed on the Singapore Exchange; and (3) the FTSE ST All 
Share Index, which contains the top 98% of all companies listed on the Mainboard.  
Ritter (1991) noted that the quantitative measurement of the long-run performance of 
initial public offerings is sensitive to the benchmark used.  We use different 
benchmarks to test whether our results remain consistent and thus be able to establish 
a stronger conclusion. 
 
Control firms are selected in the following manner.  For each sample firm, a list of 
local firms belonging to the same Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
industry group or having the same four-digit GICS code is generated.  The market 
capitalization for each local firm on December 31 of the year prior to the sample 
firm’s year of listing is then calculated.  The local firm with the market capitalization 
that is closest to that of the sample firm at the end of the sample firm’s first day of 
trading is then selected as the control firm.  Each firm may be designated as the 
control firm for only one sample firm.  If there are no more firms belonging to the 
same GICS industry group from which we can choose, then a control firm is chosen 
from the list of local firms belonging to the same GICS sector or having the same 
two-digit GICS code as the sample firm.   
 
Cumulative average adjusted returns measure the average incremental return from 
investing in Chinese firms cumulated through time.  In constructing this measure, 
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returns, including those from dividends, are first calculated monthly for the sample 
firm and the control firm or the benchmark index commencing from the end of the 
first day of trading of the sample firm until three years later or December 31, 2011, 
whichever is earlier.  For sample firms that delisted before the three-year listing 
anniversary or before December 31, 2011, returns are calculated until the last trading 
day.  Each month consists of twenty-one trading days.  The sample firm’s adjusted 
returns are then computed by subtracting the control firm’s or the benchmark index’s 
return from the sample firm’s return.  The average adjusted return for any month t is 
the arithmetic average of the adjusted returns for all sample firms.  The cumulative 
average adjusted return for month t is the sum of all the average adjusted returns from 
month 1 to month t.  Statistically significant positive cumulative average adjusted 
returns imply that investors can earn positive abnormal returns from investing in 
Chinese firms, while statistically significant negative cumulative average adjusted 
returns imply that investors earn negative abnormal returns from investing in Chinese 
firms. 
 
The wealth relative is the ratio of the wealth accumulated from a buy-and-hold 
strategy using our portfolio of sample Chinese firms to the wealth accumulated from a 
buy-and-hold strategy using the portfolio of control firms.   
 
Holding period returns are first calculated individually for the sample firms and their 
corresponding control firms for the period commencing from the end of the first day 
of trading until three years later.  Should the three-year listing anniversary of the 
sample firm fall beyond December 31, 2011, holding period returns are calculated 
only until December 31, 2011.  For sample firms that delisted before their three-year 
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listing anniversary or before December 31, 2011, returns are calculated until the last 
trading date.   
 
The wealth relative is then calculated using the following formula: 
                 
                                                   
                                                    
 
A wealth relative of more than 1 implies that Chinese firms outperformed the control 
group in terms of buy-and-hold returns and therefore investors earned positive 
abnormal returns from investing in them, while a wealth relative of less than 1 implies 
that Chinese firms underperformed the control group and therefore investors earned 
negative abnormal returns from investing in them. 
 
All of the data used in this study were taken from Bloomberg unless stated otherwise.   
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6. The underperformance of Chinese firms  
 
6.1. Results based on cumulative average adjusted returns 
 
Table 2 below shows the monthly average adjusted returns and the cumulative 
average adjusted returns for our portfolio of Chinese firms benchmarked against a 
portfolio of local control firms matched by industry and market capitalization.  Most 
of the t-statistics for the monthly average adjusted returns are insignificant; however, 
they are negative for twenty-five of the thirty-six months, which suggests that Chinese 
firms underperformed their control firms for more than two-thirds of the time.  
Cumulative average adjusted returns are significantly negative from the twelfth month 
onwards until three years later.  Over a period of three years, investors who invested 
in Chinese firms listed on SGX earned significantly less compared to those who 













Table 2: Monthly and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
Measured Versus Local Control Firms Matched by Size and Industry 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any month t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                    )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where ripo,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in event month t, 
and rcontrol,it is the total return on the corresponding control firm.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted 
return is computed for each month as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for 
month t, nt is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
the adjusted returns for month t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, 
CAR1,t, is computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and csdt is 
computed as csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event month, var is the average (over 60 













1 127 -5.88% -2.96 -5.88% -2.93 
2 127 7.39% 3.86 1.50% 0.53 
3 127 -0.63% -0.36 0.88% 0.25 
4 127 -2.01% -1.24 -1.13% -0.28 
5 127 -3.32% -1.88 -4.45% -0.99 
6 127 0.89% 0.54 -3.56% -0.73 
7 126 -1.64% -0.87 -5.20% -0.98 
8 126 -0.79% -0.47 -5.99% -1.05 
9 126 1.02% 0.61 -4.97% -0.83 
10 125 -4.79% -2.53 -9.77% -1.53 
11 125 -2.32% -1.57 -12.09% -1.81 
12 124 -3.73% -1.93 -15.82% -2.26 
13 123 -1.79% -0.79 -17.61% -2.40 
14 123 -0.84% -0.37 -18.45% -2.43 
15 121 -1.06% -0.58 -19.50% -2.46 
16 120 -1.61% -0.83 -21.11% -2.56 
17 120 -0.97% -0.55 -22.08% -2.60 
18 120 -1.26% -0.39 -23.34% -2.67 
19 119 0.70% 0.39 -22.64% -2.51 
20 119 0.25% 0.17 -22.39% -2.42 
21 119 -4.25% -1.92 -26.64% -2.81 
22 117 -2.44% -1.33 -29.09% -2.98 
23 116 1.15% 0.56 -27.94% -2.78 
24 114 -3.02% -0.89 -30.96% -2.99 
25 114 -1.93% -1.08 -32.89% -3.12 
26 114 4.21% 2.14 -28.68% -2.66 
27 113 -3.15% -0.85 -31.84% -2.89 
28 110 0.59% 0.32 -31.25% -2.75 
29 108 2.49% 1.60 -28.76% -2.46 
30 108 -1.26% -0.75 -30.02% -2.53 
31 108 3.30% 2.01 -26.72% -2.21 
32 108 -5.20% -1.86 -31.92% -2.60 
33 108 -3.44% -1.59 -35.37% -2.84 
34 108 -0.76% -0.39 -36.12% -2.86 
35 108 0.17% 0.09 -35.95% -2.80 
36 108 -3.93% -1.58 -39.88% -3.06 
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Table 3 below shows the three-year monthly average adjusted returns and the 
cumulative average adjusted returns for our portfolio of Chinese firms as 
benchmarked against the FTSE Straits Times Index.  Although the t-statistics for the 
monthly average adjusted returns are mostly insignificant, they are negative for 
twenty-six of the thirty-six months in our sample period.  This suggests that having 
invested in Chinese firms would have been less profitable compared to having 
invested in the FTSE Straits Times Index at any given month for more than two-thirds 
of the time.  Cumulative average adjusted returns are significantly negative from the 
seventh month onwards until the thirty-sixth month, and they show that Chinese firms 
started significantly underperforming the FTSE Straits Times Index from the seventh 
month after listing until three years later.  These results are largely consistent with the 
previous table wherein the portfolio of local control firms was used as the benchmark 
and support the conclusion that the investors who invested in Chinese firms listed on 












Table 3: Monthly and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
Measured Versus the FTSE Straits Times Index 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any month t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                    )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where ripo,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in event month t, 
and rcontrol,it is the total return on the benchmark index.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is 
computed for each month as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for month t, nt 
is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
adjusted returns for month t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, 
CAR1,t, is computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and csdt is 
computed as csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event month, var is the average (over 60 













1 127 -7.91% -4.29 -7.91% -5.07 
2 127 5.95% 3.61 -1.95% -0.89 
3 127 -1.28% -0.80 -3.23% -1.20 
4 127 -3.26% -2.39 -6.49% -2.08 
5 127 -1.73% -1.47 -8.22% -2.36 
6 127 1.76% 1.28 -6.46% -1.69 
7 126 -2.20% -1.49 -8.66% -2.09 
8 126 -1.45% -1.10 -10.11% -2.29 
9 126 -0.37% -0.28 -10.48% -2.23 
10 125 -4.18% -3.65 -14.66% -2.95 
11 125 -1.26% -0.97 -15.92% -3.06 
12 124 -3.45% -3.00 -19.37% -3.55 
13 124 -1.03% -0.64 -20.41% -3.59 
14 124 0.44% 0.27 -19.97% -3.39 
15 122 0.59% 0.41 -19.37% -3.15 
16 121 -0.25% -0.18 -19.62% -3.08 
17 121 -2.13% -1.59 -21.75% -3.31 
18 121 1.87% 1.26 -19.88% -2.94 
19 120 -0.40% -0.28 -20.28% -2.90 
20 120 -0.08% -0.06 -20.37% -2.84 
21 120 -1.70% -1.15 -22.07% -3.01 
22 118 -2.13% -1.53 -24.20% -3.19 
23 117 0.18% 0.11 -24.02% -3.09 
24 116 -0.37% -0.21 -24.39% -3.05 
25 116 -1.94% -1.39 -26.33% -3.23 
26 116 3.13% 1.74 -23.20% -2.79 
27 115 2.05% 1.36 -21.15% -2.49 
28 112 -0.63% -0.43 -21.78% -2.48 
29 110 0.74% 0.51 -21.03% -2.33 
30 110 -1.27% -1.03 -22.30% -2.43 
31 110 2.72% 1.79 -19.58% -2.10 
32 110 -1.23% -0.71 -20.80% -2.20 
33 110 -0.39% -0.29 -21.19% -2.20 
34 110 -2.43% -1.83 -23.63% -2.42 
35 110 -0.06% -0.04 -23.69% -2.39 
36 110 -2.44% -1.51 -26.13% -2.60 
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Table 4 below shows the three-year monthly average adjusted returns and the 
cumulative average adjusted returns for our portfolio of Chinese firms as 
benchmarked against the FTSE ST All Share Index.  Monthly average adjusted 
returns are negative for twenty-four out of the thirty-six months in our sample period, 
although the t-statistics are not significant for most months.  These imply that more 
than half the time for any given month, investors were better off having invested in 
the broad FTSE ST All Share Index than in our portfolio of sample Chinese firms.  
Cumulative average adjusted returns are significantly negative from the seventh 
month until the thirty-sixth month, which shows that the returns from buying and 
holding our portfolio of Chinese firms are lower than the returns from investing in the 
broad-based FTSE ST All Share Index from the seventh month after the Chinese 
firms’ listing until three years later.  These results are again consistent with those 
from the previous two tables in supporting the conclusion that the investors who 
invest in Chinese firms listed on SGX made less returns than those who invested in 











Table 4: Monthly and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
Measured Versus the FTSE ST All Share Index 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any month t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                    )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where ripo,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in event month t, 
and rcontrol,it is the total return on the benchmark index.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is 
computed for each month as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for month t, nt 
is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
adjusted returns for month t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, 
CAR1,t, is computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and csdt is 
computed as csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event month, var is the average (over 60 













1 127 -7.62% -4.20 -7.62% -5.36 
2 127 5.84% 3.60 -1.78% -0.88 
3 127 -1.17% -0.75 -2.95% -1.20 
4 127 -2.97% -2.21 -5.92% -2.08 
5 127 -1.62% -1.39 -7.54% -2.37 
6 127 1.89% 1.41 -5.65% -1.62 
7 126 -2.10% -1.45 -7.74% -2.05 
8 126 -1.27% -0.97 -9.01% -2.23 
9 126 -0.36% -0.27 -9.37% -2.19 
10 125 -4.02% -3.55 -13.39% -2.96 
11 125 -1.19% -0.94 -14.58% -3.07 
12 124 -3.28% -2.91 -17.86% -3.59 
13 124 -0.87% -0.55 -18.73% -3.61 
14 124 0.48% 0.30 -18.25% -3.39 
15 122 0.60% 0.42 -17.66% -3.15 
16 122 -0.09% -0.06 -17.75% -3.06 
17 121 -2.08% -1.58 -19.82% -3.30 
18 121 2.00% 1.38 -17.82% -2.89 
19 120 -0.37% -0.26 -18.20% -2.86 
20 120 0.04% 0.03 -18.15% -2.78 
21 120 -1.57% -1.08 -19.72% -2.94 
22 118 -2.10% -1.53 -21.81% -3.16 
23 117 0.29% 0.17 -21.52% -3.03 
24 116 -0.23% -0.13 -21.76% -2.99 
25 116 -1.87% -1.34 -23.62% -3.18 
26 116 3.17% 1.79 -20.46% -2.70 
27 115 2.05% 1.37 -18.41% -2.37 
28 112 -0.58% -0.40 -18.99% -2.37 
29 110 0.74% 0.51 -18.25% -2.22 
30 110 -1.16% -0.96 -19.41% -2.32 
31 110 2.79% 1.87 -16.62% -1.96 
32 110 -1.23% -0.72 -17.85% -2.07 
33 110 -0.46% -0.35 -18.30% -2.09 
34 110 -2.30% -1.76 -20.60% -2.31 
35 110 0.15% 0.09 -20.45% -2.26 
36 110 -2.34% -1.46 -22.79% -2.49 
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The results of the previous three tables all similarly show that Chinese firms have 
lower cumulative average adjusted returns when benchmarked against a portfolio of 
local control firms, the FTSE Straits Times Index, and the FTSE ST All Share Index.  
It is then strongly implied and supported that investors earn negative abnormal returns 
from investing in Chinese firms listed on SGX compared to investing in local 
comparable firms.  Figure 1 presents a graph of cumulative average adjusted returns 
of our portfolio of Chinese sample firms versus the three benchmarks above.   
 
Figure 1: Graph of Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 




Among our sample, only one Chinese firm was suspended indefinitely from trading in 
the middle of the three-year period over which we calculated cumulative average 
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abnormal returns.  No firm was delisted during the three-year period.  As such, if we 
are to consider the ramifications of an indefinite trading suspension to be similar to a 
delist, only one firm is subject to the delisting bias mentioned in Shumway (1997) and 
Shumway and Warther (1999).  Should we assign a value at which that firm’s stock 
can be bought or sold after it has been suspended from trading, that value can 
logically only be lower than the last transacted value and thus amplify our results of 
Chinese firms underperforming their local control firms.   
 
All other Chinese firms with accounting scandals were delisted or suspended from 
trading more than three years from their listing date, beyond our return calculation 
period. 
6.2. Results based on the wealth relative 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of the holding period returns over a three-year period 
for the portfolio of Chinese firms in our sample and the portfolio of corresponding 
control firms.  Holding period returns are positive only from the eighty-fifth 
percentile upwards for Chinese firms, but they are positive from the sixty-fifth 
percentile upwards for local control firms.  The median holding period return is -
52.56% for Chinese firms and -10.99% for local control firms.  Chinese firms have a 
mean holding period return of -25.08%, whereas local control firms have a much 
higher mean holding period return of 6.08%.  The resulting wealth relative value is 
0.7012, which implies that for every one dollar in terminal wealth for an investor who 
invested in local control firms, one who invested in Chinese firms would only have 
seventy cents.   
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In terms of a buy-and-hold strategy for a period of three years from the listing date or 
until December 31, 2011, Chinese firms underperform local comparable firms on 
average. 
 
Table 5: Holding Period Returns for the Sample Chinese Firms and Local Control 
Firms Matched by Size and Industry 
The holding period return for firm i is calculated as [       (         ∑     
 
   )]         ⁄ , where 
Pi,end is the price of the firm’s stock at the end of the five-year period from the sample firm’s listing 
date or on December 31, 2011, whichever is earlier, Pi,start is the closing price of the firm’s stock on the 
sample firm’s listing date, and di,t is the total amount of dividends that the firm distributed in year t.   
 
Three-year Holding Period Returns 
Percentile: Sample Chinese Firms: Local Control Firms: 
1 -90.71% -93.18% 
5 -85.56% -82.07% 
10 -84.20% -68.88% 
15 -79.85% -61.98% 
16 -79.24% -61.71% 
20 -76.47% -56.06% 
25 -71.35% -48.32% 
30 -65.30% -39.13% 
35 -62.07% -33.56% 
40 -58.62% -24.18% 
45 -54.76% -19.42% 
50 -52.56% -10.99% 
55 -47.43% -7.33% 
60 -42.23% -3.77% 
65 -36.51% 3.76% 
70 -27.23% 19.36% 
75 -17.75% 26.81% 
80 -1.42% 47.33% 
85 25.35% 71.63% 
90 61.29% 114.14% 
95 150.07% 157.42% 




6.3. Results from controlling for the established anomaly of IPO 
underperformance within the first three years after listing 
 
Upon examining the stock price performance of firms in the United States during their 
first three years of being listed, Ritter (1991) found out that these firms significantly 
underperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry from the 
ninth month onwards.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) studied all companies that issued 
stock between 1970 and 1990 and discovered that IPO stocks significantly 
underperformed non-IPO stocks for up to five years after listing.  IPO stocks had 
average annual returns of only five percent while non-IPO stocks had average annual 
returns of twelve percent.  As we measured the returns of our Chinese sample firms 
over the first three-year period since their listing, it is thereby possible that our results 
are simply reflective of the same established anomaly instead of a “China effect”.   
 
To test the robustness of our results, we use a portfolio of control firms matched by 
industry and listing date as a benchmark against which we measure the cumulative 
average abnormal returns of Chinese firms.  Control firms are selected in the 
following manner.  For each sample firm, a list of local firms with the same four-digit 
GICS code is generated.  The list is then sorted according to listing date.  We choose 
the local firm that listed right before the sample firm as its control firm.  Each local 
firm may be designated as the control firm for only one sample firm.  Should the gap 
between listing dates of the sample firm and local firm that listed right before it 
exceed three years, we consider the sample firm to have no control firm and is 
therefore dropped from the sample.   
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Table 6 below shows the three-year monthly average adjusted returns and the 
cumulative average adjusted returns for our portfolio of Chinese firms as 
benchmarked against the portfolio of most recently listed local firms.  Monthly 
average adjusted returns are still negative for twenty-four out of the thirty-six months 
in our sample period, although the t-statistics are not significant for most months. 
Cumulative average adjusted returns remain significantly negative from the ninth 
month until the thirty-sixth month, which shows that the returns from buying and 
holding our portfolio of Chinese firms are lower than the returns from investing in the 
most recently listed local comparable firms from the ninth month after the Chinese 



























Table 6: Monthly and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
Measured Versus the Most Recently Listed Local Firms 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any month t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                    )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where ripo,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in event month t, 
and rcontrol,it is the total return on the benchmark index.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is 
computed for each month as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for month t, nt 
is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
adjusted returns for month t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, 
CAR1,t, is computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and csdt is 
computed as csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event month, var is the average (over 60 













1 86 -6.27% -2.35 -6.27% -2.64 
2 86 4.85% 2.08 -1.42% -0.42 
3 86 -3.53% -1.55 -4.95% -1.21 
4 86 -2.53% -1.56 -7.48% -1.58 
5 86 -1.98% -1.10 -9.46% -1.79 
6 86 1.10% 0.59 -8.36% -1.45 
7 85 -1.16% -0.39 -9.53% -1.52 
8 85 -2.40% -1.04 -11.93% -1.78 
9 85 -4.43% -2.02 -16.36% -2.30 
10 84 -2.16% -0.93 -18.52% -2.45 
11 84 -1.41% -0.64 -19.93% -2.52 
12 84 -6.38% -2.53 -26.32% -3.18 
13 84 -0.12% -0.06 -26.44% -3.07 
14 84 3.50% 1.35 -22.94% -2.57 
15 84 -3.62% -1.71 -26.57% -2.87 
16 83 2.33% 1.21 -24.23% -2.52 
17 83 -5.61% -2.69 -29.84% -3.01 
18 83 1.16% 0.46 -28.68% -2.81 
19 82 -3.24% -1.24 -31.92% -3.03 
20 82 -1.36% -0.52 -33.28% -3.08 
21 82 0.95% 0.38 -32.33% -2.92 
22 81 -0.79% -0.33 -33.12% -2.90 
23 81 -1.47% -0.56 -34.59% -2.97 
24 80 1.36% 0.48 -33.23% -2.77 
25 80 -0.57% -0.26 -33.80% -2.76 
26 80 4.80% 1.78 -29.00% -2.32 
27 79 -0.83% -0.30 -29.83% -2.33 
28 77 0.29% 0.13 -29.54% -2.24 
29 75 2.95% 1.25 -26.58% -1.95 
30 75 -1.83% -0.78 -28.41% -2.05 
31 75 3.49% 1.36 -24.92% -1.77 
32 75 -5.10% -2.06 -30.02% -2.10 
33 75 -2.06% -0.95 -32.08% -2.21 
34 75 -2.95% -1.08 -35.03% -2.38 
35 75 2.57% 0.91 -32.46% -2.17 
36 75 -4.13% -1.29 -36.59% -2.41 
 35 
 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the holding period returns over a three-year period 
for the portfolio of Chinese firms in our sample and the portfolio of most recently 
listed local firms within the same industries.  Holding period returns are positive only 
from the eighty-fifth percentile upwards for Chinese firms, but they are positive from 
the sixtieth percentile upwards for the most recently listed local control firms.  The 
median holding period return is -52.74% for Chinese firms and -24.31% for the most 
recently listed local control firms.  Chinese firms have a mean holding period return 
of -29.49%, whereas the most recently listed local control firms have a much higher 
mean holding period return of 9.28%.  The resulting wealth relative value is 0.6453, 
which implies that for every one dollar in terminal wealth for an investor who 
invested in the most recently listed local control firms, one who invested in Chinese 
firms would only have sixty-four cents.  In terms of a buy-and-hold strategy for a 
period of three years from the listing date or until December 31, 2011, Chinese firms 



















Table 7: Holding Period Returns for the Sample Chinese Firms and Most Recently 
Listed Local Control Firms 
The holding period return for firm i is calculated as [       (         ∑     
 
   )]         ⁄ , where 
Pi,end is the price of the firm’s stock at the end of the five-year period from the sample firm’s listing 
date or on December 31, 2011, whichever is earlier, Pi,start is the closing price of the firm’s stock on the 
sample firm’s listing date, and di,t is the total amount of dividends that the firm distributed in year t.   
 
Three-year Holding Period Returns 
Percentile: Sample Chinese Firms: 
Most Recently Listed 
Local Control Firms: 
1 -90.71% -90.43% 
5 -87.62% -81.63% 
10 -84.87% -70.71% 
15 -82.91% -65.52% 
20 -79.24% -62.12% 
25 -75.86% -57.50% 
30 -70.58% -50.85% 
35 -66.54% -47.53% 
40 -63.48% -39.11% 
45 -57.74% -35.71% 
50 -52.74% -24.31% 
55 -47.43% -19.42% 
60 -43.12% 0.89% 
65 -37.29% 5.30% 
70 -31.14% 14.45% 
75 -22.12% 35.72% 
80 -5.19% 40.98% 
85 25.35% 87.85% 
90 56.78% 130.97% 
95 91.08% 210.61% 
100 357.40% 444.21% 
 
These results confirm that the underperformance of Chinese firms listed on SGX 
when benchmarked against local control firms matched by size and industry is not 
simply because of the anomaly of IPO firms generally underperforming within the 




6.4. Results from controlling for home bias 
 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) calculated the market capitalization of various countries 
as a percentage of the total global market capitalization and compared these figures 
against the percentage of each country’s equity portfolio in domestic equities.  They 
found that equity portfolios are largely concentrated in the domestic equity market of 
the investor.  Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found that even within the U.S. domestic 
market, geographical proximity plays an important role in determining portfolio 
choices.  Uppal (2002) noted that an important factor that may be causing home bias 
is unfamiliarity with foreign firms and the perceived need to expend greater costs and 
efforts to analyze foreign stocks compared to local ones.   
 
It is highly possible that our results are being driven by home bias.  If investors indeed 
have a home bias, demand for local stocks will push up their prices and the perceived 
extra costs in analyzing Chinese stocks will also cause investors to discount the prices 
of Chinese stocks more.   Chinese firms will appear to underperform relative to the 
local control portfolio.   
 
We therefore use a portfolio of foreign firms matched by industry as another 
benchmark against the portfolio of Chinese firms to rule out the possibility of home 
bias driving our results.  Foreign control firms are chosen by generating a list of firms 
with the same four-digit GICS code and then by sorting them by listing date.  The 
control firm for each sample firm is chosen to be the firm that is not based in or does 
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not conduct majority of its business in China or in Singapore and listed most recently 
before the sample firm.  Due to the small number of foreign, non-Chinese firms listed 
on SGX, Chinese firms with no control firms are dropped from the sample.  The final 
sample consists of only twenty-eight firms. 
 
Table 8 below shows the three-year monthly average adjusted returns and the 
cumulative average adjusted returns for our portfolio of Chinese firms as 
benchmarked against the portfolio of most recently listed foreign, non-Chinese firms.  
Monthly average adjusted returns are still negative for only seventeen out of the 
thirty-six months in our sample period, and the t-statistics are not significant for most 

















Table 8: Monthly and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
Measured Versus the Most Recently Listed Foreign Non-Chinese Firms 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any month t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                    )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where ripo,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in event month t, 
and rcontrol,it is the total return on the benchmark index.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is 
computed for each month as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for month t, nt 
is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
adjusted returns for month t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, 
CAR1,t, is computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and csdt is 
computed as csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event month, var is the average (over 60 













1 28 -0.66% -0.16 -0.66% -0.17 
2 28 6.28% 1.31 5.62% 1.05 
3 28 0.12% 0.04 5.74% 0.88 
4 28 -1.78% -0.53 3.96% 0.52 
5 28 -2.54% -0.68 1.43% 0.17 
6 28 5.22% 1.88 6.64% 0.72 
7 28 -0.74% -0.17 5.90% 0.59 
8 28 -1.86% -0.51 4.04% 0.38 
9 28 1.82% 0.78 5.86% 0.52 
10 27 0.87% 0.36 6.73% 0.55 
11 27 -4.19% -1.17 2.54% 0.20 
12 27 -1.58% -0.52 0.96% 0.07 
13 27 1.93% 0.65 2.89% 0.21 
14 27 12.07% 3.59 14.96% 1.04 
15 27 -0.30% -0.08 14.65% 0.98 
16 26 1.46% 0.34 16.12% 1.03 
17 26 -2.66% -0.83 13.45% 0.83 
18 26 6.46% 2.09 19.91% 1.20 
19 26 -7.98% -2.05 11.93% 0.70 
20 26 0.11% 0.03 12.04% 0.69 
21 26 5.15% 1.54 17.19% 0.96 
22 26 5.28% 1.77 22.46% 1.22 
23 26 5.57% 1.33 28.03% 1.49 
24 26 0.96% 0.29 28.99% 1.51 
25 26 -3.98% -1.00 25.01% 1.28 
26 26 5.01% 0.98 30.01% 1.50 
27 26 -3.93% -1.10 26.09% 1.28 
28 25 -3.73% -1.19 22.36% 1.06 
29 24 1.40% 0.30 23.77% 1.08 
30 24 -0.13% -0.03 23.63% 1.06 
31 24 3.99% 0.52 27.63% 1.22 
32 24 -10.82% -2.43 16.81% 0.73 
33 24 -2.11% -0.40 14.70% 0.63 
34 24 1.35% 0.48 16.04% 0.67 
35 24 0.15% 0.04 16.20% 0.67 
36 24 -6.01% -1.56 10.19% 0.42 
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Table 9 shows the distribution of the holding period returns over a three-year period 
for the portfolio of Chinese firms in our subsample and the portfolio of most recently 
listed local firms within the same industries.  The distribution of the returns for both 
portfolios is largely similar.  The Chinese firms in our subsample have a mean 
holding period return of -7.48% while the most recently listed foreign, non-Chinese 
firms have a mean holding period return of -11.74%.  The wealth relative is 1.043, 
which is not far from 1 and thus implies that investing in Chinese firms and in other 
foreign, non-Chinese firms will yield almost similar returns.   
 
These results imply that there is no significant difference in the returns from Chinese 
firms and from other recently listed foreign, non-Chinese firms, in which case our 
earlier results may be attributable to home bias.  However, we should interpret this 










Table 9: Holding Period Returns for the Sample Chinese Firms and Most Recently 
Listed Foreign Non-Chinese Control Firms 
The holding period return for firm i is calculated as [       (         ∑     
 
   )]         ⁄ , where 
Pi,end is the price of the firm’s stock at the end of the five-year period from the sample firm’s listing 
date or on December 31, 2011, whichever is earlier, Pi,start is the closing price of the firm’s stock on the 
sample firm’s listing date, and di,t is the total amount of dividends that the firm distributed in year t.   
 
Three-year Holding Period Returns 
Rank: Sample Chinese Firms: 
Most Recently Listed 
Foreign Non-Chinese 
Firms: 
1 -90.71% -76.19% 
2 -84.95% -75.60% 
3 -75.86% -74.35% 
4 -73.54% -61.99% 
5 -72.90% -56.43% 
6 -58.96% -49.04% 
7 -54.73% -46.59% 
8 -52.79% -45.65% 
9 -51.71% -44.34% 
10 -49.15% -39.01% 
11 -47.43% -37.50% 
12 -43.12% -25.73% 
13 -41.87% -21.88% 
14 -39.68% -14.64% 
15 -37.29% -10.32% 
16 -31.80% -4.63% 
17 -27.17% -2.68% 
18 -23.60% -1.73% 
19 -17.07% 20.58% 
20 16.26% 21.28% 
21 17.64% 21.70% 
22 25.35% 29.31% 
23 33.76% 30.98% 
24 56.78% 38.47% 
25 150.07% 42.03% 
26 170.02% 48.86% 





7. Accounting irregularities as an explanation of underperformance 
 
In this section, we examine whether the presence of a reported accounting irregularity 
is significantly related to the long-term underperformance of a Chinese firm. 
 
7.1. Prior research on the stock performance of firms with reported corporate 
illegalities or accounting irregularities 
 
Prior research has found that reports of corporate illegalities, including financial 
reporting violations, have a negative impact on the implicated firm’s abnormal returns 
within a short time window after the illegality has been made public.   
 
Davidson and Worrell (1988) conducted a study measuring the impact of corporate 
illegalities on stock returns.  Their sample consisted of all ninety-six firms listed on 
either the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange that had been 
convicted of blatant illegalities such as bribery, criminal fraud, tax evasion, illegal 
political contributions, and criminal antitrust violations.  They found evidence of 
statistically significant abnormal returns of -8% for the sample firms on the day that 
news wire services ran the story of their alleged illegal activities.  No other 
statistically significant abnormal returns were found in various time windows within 
the period three months before and three months after the announcement.   
 
Delving deeper, Davidson, Worrell, and Lee (1994) calculated the abnormal returns 
for different categories of corporate illegalities using a sample of 535 announcements 
of such wrongdoings from the Wall Street Journal.  Firms that were the subjects of 
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announcements of financial reporting violations on average suffered significantly 
abnormal returns of -2.8% starting from the day before till the day after the 
announcement was made.   
 
Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) measured the abnormal returns of fifty-eight U.S. 
firms that were the subjects of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs).  The Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases describe the 
investigations carried out by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
alleged violations of accounting provisions of the securities laws.  As such, the 
subjects of AAERs allegedly committed accounting violations.  Abnormal returns 
were calculated over a fourteen-day time window around the following three 
disclosure milestones: (1) the first disclosure date of the accounting reporting 
violation; (2) the date of the disclosure of the SEC investigation; and (3) the final 
settlement date of the investigations.  They found that on the day that a sample firm 
was reported in the press to be the subject of a violation of accounting rules, the 
sample firm’s cumulative abnormal returns decreased by an average of 10%, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  They interpreted this decrease in 
cumulative abnormal returns to mean that the market perceives this information to 
have negative implications for the sample firm’s future economic prospects, in line 
with the analysts’ downward revisions of earnings forecasts.  The sign and magnitude 
of the abnormal returns were also found to have a significantly positive correlation to 
the dollar income effect of the accounting violation.  Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) 
also found that on the date of the disclosure of SEC investigations, the sample firm’s 
cumulative abnormal returns dropped further by an average of 5%; this is interpreted 
to be an incremental market effect that may be related to the negative publicity 
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brought upon by the formal SEC investigations.  No significant abnormal returns were 
found around the date of the settlement of investigations.   
 
The results of the study by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) concur with those by 
Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991).  Using a sample of ninety-two firms against whom 
the SEC brought actions between April 1982 and December 1992, Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1996) found an average stock price decline of 9% on the day that an 
announcement was released regarding the firm’s alleged accounting violation.  They 
also found evidence of increased bid-ask spreads, a drop in analyst following, an 
increase in short interest, and an increased dispersion in analyst forecasts.  These 
results were interpreted to mean that investors revised downwards their beliefs about 
the firms’ future economic prospects and credibility of financial disclosures, and 
hence provided indirect evidence that these firms then faced increased costs of capital.   
 
Gerety and Lehn (1997) found smaller but still significant average cumulative 
abnormal returns of -3.05% for sixty-two firms charged by the SEC for committing 
financial disclosure violations between 1981 and 1987.  The cumulative abnormal 
returns were measured over a three-day window from the day before till the day after 
the first public announcement of the disclosure violation.   
 
Errors in previously issued financial statements may need to be corrected by issuing 
restatements.  A firm that issues a restatement can therefore be said to have made an 
admission that it had not properly followed financial reporting rules previously, 
possibly intentionally misleading investors.  Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) 
studied the market reaction for a sample of 403 firms that issued earnings 
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restatements between 1995 and 1999.  They found a market-adjusted mean abnormal 
return of -9.2%, which is economically and statistically significant, over the day of 
and the day after the announcement of the restatement.  Restatements that are 
associated with larger negative abnormal returns are those that involve fraud, are 
attributed to auditors, affect multiple accounts, and decrease previously reported 
income by a larger magnitude.  Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) interpreted 
these results to be indicative of both diminished company prospects and increased risk 
from greater perceived information asymmetry between the firm’s management and 
investors.   
 
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) found a corresponding relative percentage increase of 7% 
to 19% in the cost of capital for a sample of 292 firms that issued restatements from 
January 1997 to June 2002.  This increase in the cost of capital was detected as early 
as the month following the restatement.  It is not known how long it would normally 
take for the cost of capital to revert to previous levels.  Furthermore, similar to 
Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004), they found that restatements attributable to 
external auditors were associated with the largest increase in the cost of capital.   
 
On a different note, Lee et al. (2012) found that despite a number of Chinese reverse 
mergers in the United States being accused of accounting fraud and many of them 
changing auditors, those accused of fraud experience stock returns indistinguishable 
from their control firms.   
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7.2. The stock price performance of SGX-listed firms reported to have 
accounting irregularities 
 
We try to examine the stock price reaction of SGX-listed firms in the three-day 
window surrounding the first report in the press of an accounting irregularity.   
 
Among the thirteen firms in our sample, only five firms traded continuously through 
the period when the first report of an accounting irregularity came out in the press.  
Table 10 below provides the summary statistics of the daily adjusted returns and the 
cumulative average adjusted returns, calculated against the sample firms’ control 
firms, experienced by SGX-listed firms when they were first reported in the press to 
have accounting irregularities.  
 
Table 10: Daily and Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Chinese Firms 
When First Reported in the Press to Have Accounting Irregularities Measured 
Versus Local Control Firms 
Average adjusted return (AAR) for any day t is calculated as follows: AARt = 
[∑ (                     )
  
   ]   ⁄ , where rfirm,it is the total return on the Chinese firm i in day t, and 
rcontrol,it is the total return on the corresponding control firm.  The t-statistic for the average adjusted 
return is computed for each day as: AARt
 × √nt/sdt, where AARt is the average adjusted return for day t, 
nt is the number of observations in day t, and sdt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 
adjusted returns for day t.  The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in day t, CAR1,t, is 
computed as CAR1,t × √nt/csdt, where nt is the number of observations in day t, and csdt is computed as 
csdt = [t × var + 2 × (t-1) × cov]
1/2
, where t is the event day, var is the average (over 3 days) cross-











-1 6.34% 1.34 6.34% 1.02 
0 -11.66% -1.63 -5.32% -0.69 
1 -1.39% -0.44 -6.71% -0.75 
 
We see a large negative average adjusted return of -11.66% and a decrease in the 
cumulative average adjusted return of 5.32% on the day that reports of an accounting 
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irregularity first appeared in the press.  These results are consistent with prior findings 
in the literature.  The t-statistics are not significant; however, we attribute this lack of 
significance to the very small number of firms that continued to trade after the report 
of the accounting irregularity surfaced.   
 
We are unable to measure the effect of the reported accounting irregularity on the 
stock prices of seven firms which had their shares halted from trading before the 
report of the accounting irregularity surfaced in the press.  Of these seven firms, one 
firm eventually delisted.  The other six firms suspended the trading of their shares 
before reports of accounting irregularities appeared in newswires as they underwent 
special audits to ascertain their financial positions and delayed the release of their 
financial results.  Four of these six firms almost went into liquidation as they 
defaulted on bond payments.  All six firms had to seek out new investors and are 
currently restructuring and reestablishing their operations.  Their shares remain under 
trading suspension as they are still in the midst of preparing their resumption of 
trading proposals to submit to SGX. 
 
Judging from the defaults on bond payments and threats of liquidation, the prices of 
these firms’ shares would have also declined by a large percentage had the shares 
been traded continuously.  Due to the illiquidity of the shares resulting from the long 
and drawn-out trading suspension, investors who wish to dispose of their shares 
would have to do so under deep discounts from the last traded price.  Either way, 
investors in these firms suffered considerable losses.  These findings are consistent 
with those in prior research.   
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7.3. Regression of relative performance against accounting irregularities 
 
While prior research has mostly found that firms reported to have corporate 
illegalities, financial reporting violations, and accounting restatements underperform 
in the short term, it is conceivable for this underperformance to extend to a longer 
period.  As these firms had been less than truthful in the past, investors may become 
more dubious of any subsequent news released by the firm, leading them to 
underreact to good news and overreact to bad news.  These firms will then continue to 
underperform relative to the market benchmark or their control firms until their 
credibility is restored.   
 
We therefore state our first hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:  
 
H1: A reported accounting irregularity would have a significant negative impact on 
the long-term relative stock performance of a firm. 
 
Chang et al. (2010) also found underwriter reputation to be a significant determinant 
of post-IPO twelve-month buy-and-hold returns.  If so, then an underwriter’s 
disrepute should negatively impact a firm’s post-IPO long-term returns.  An 
underwriter’s reputation and credibility can be undermined by a report of an 
accounting irregularity at one of its previous IPO clients.  We therefore make the 
following second hypothesis:  
 
 49 
H1: A reported accounting irregularity at one of the underwriter’s clients would have 
a significant negative impact on the long-term relative stock performance of the 
underwriter’s other clients. 
 
We use the following ordinary least squares regression model to examine whether a 
reported accounting irregularity is significantly related to the long-term relative stock 
performance of an SGX-listed Chinese firm: 
 
Adj_Reti = b0 + b1Init_Reti + b2Log_Agei + b3IPO_Voli + b4Offer_Sizei + b5Scandali 
+ b6Underwriteri 
 
Adj_Reti is the cumulative adjusted return for the sample firm from its listing date 
until its three-year anniversary of December 31, 2011, whichever is earlier.  We use 
the following three proxies for Adj_Reti based on different benchmarks of normal 
returns: (1) Adj_Controli, which is calculated using the sample firm’s control firm as 
the benchmark; (2) Adj_FSSTIi, which is calculated using the FTSE Straits Times 
Index as the benchmark; and (3) Adj_FSTASi, which is calculated using the FTSE ST 
All Share Index as the benchmark.   
 
We test our first hypothesis using the variable Scandali, which is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the sample firm was reported in the press to have had an accounting 
irregularity within three years after going public.  A significantly negative coefficient 
on Scandali would strongly imply that the presence of a reported accounting 
irregularity is associated with poorer long-term relative stock price performance of 
Chinese firms listed on SGX.  To determine the sample firms that have been reported 
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to have had an accounting irregularity, a thorough search for the entire sample period 
was performed in the Factiva database using various keywords similar to “accounting 
irregularity”.   
 
We test our second hypothesis using the variable Underwriteri, which is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the following two conditions are met: (1) The sample firm’s 
underwriter was also the underwriter of another firm that had been reported in the 
press to have had an accounting irregularity within three years from the firm’s listing 
date; and (2) The accounting irregularity at one of the underwriter’s other clients must 
have been reported within the period for which the sample firm’s cumulative market-
adjusted return was measured.  A significantly negative coefficient would strongly 
imply that the effect in the underwriter’s reputation from a reported accounting 
irregularity at one of its IPO clients negatively impacts the long-term relative stock 
price performance of its other clients.  The underwriter of each sample firm was 
identified through the sample firm’s IPO prospectus posted on the SGX website.   
 
We control for other variables that have been found to have a significant impact on 
firms’ long-term cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
Init_Reti is the market-adjusted initial return of the sample firm, measured as the 
return of the firm on its first day of trading less the return of the market on that day.  
Ritter (1991) found that the initial return of a firm is inversely related to its three-year 
total return.  As the cumulative adjusted return is calculated as the total return less the 
market return, we expect the market-adjusted initial return of a firm to be inversely 
related to its cumulative adjusted return as well.  Other studies that found significantly 
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negative relations between three-year abnormal returns and market-adjusted initial 
returns include those of Chi and Padgett (2005), Cai et al. (2008), and Chi et al. 
(2010).  We predict the coefficient of Init_Reti to be negative.  We use both the FTSE 
Straits Times Index and the FTSE ST All Share Index as proxies for the market in 
calculating market-adjusted initial returns, thereby constructing the variables 
IR_FSSTIi and IR_FSTASi respectively.   
 
Log_Agei is the natural logarithm of one plus the age of the sample firm at the time of 
listing, wherein the age of the sample firm is calculated as the year of listing less the 
year the sample firm was founded.  The year of founding is obtained from the sample 
firm’s IPO prospectus posted on the SGX website.  Ritter (1991) found that age 
significantly explains differences in the total three-year returns of firms with older 
firms experiencing higher returns.  Chen et al. (2000) also found that age is a 
significant determinant of three-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for 
Chinese IPOs.  Both studies interpreted age as a proxy for ex ante risk.  We expect the 
coefficient of Log_Agei to be positive.   
 
IPO_Voli is the number of initial public offerings in the year that the sample firm 
went public.  This variable is calculated by counting the number of publicly listed 
firms whose listing dates fall within the same calendar year as the sample firm and 
then scaling the number by 100.  Ritter (1991) found that the three-year returns of 
firms who went public in high-volume years were lower on average than those of 
firms who went public in low-volume years, as firms appear to take advantage of 
periods whereby investors are irrationally over optimistic about certain industries.  
We thus predict IPO_Voli to have a negative coefficient. 
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Offer_Sizei is the total amount of proceeds raised in the sample firm’s initial public 
offering and is calculated by multiplying the number of shares offered and the final 
offer price.  Chi and Padgett (2005) found the coefficient of this variable to be 
significantly negative in explaining the three-year cumulative market-adjusted returns 
of Chinese stocks.  They interpreted this finding to mean that given the popularity of a 
firm’s stock, the more the supply of the firm’s stock, the less is the excess demand 
and the lower the stock price, and consequently its performance, in the future.  Cai et 
al. (2008) and Chi et al. (2010) likewise found significantly negative relationships 
between three-year abnormal returns and offering sizes.  We predict the coefficient of 
Offer_Sizei to be negative.   
 
Table 11 below shows the results of our ordinary least squares regression using our 
sample of Chinese firms.  In Panel A, our dependent variable is Adj_Controli.  We run 
the regression twice, the first time using the FTSE Straits Times Index and the second 
time using the FTSE ST All Share Index as the market proxy.  The coefficients of all 
the variables are not significant, and only the coefficients for IPO_Voli and 
Underwriteri resulted in the expected sign.  Based on the result outlined in Panel A of 
Table 6, having a reported accounting irregularity or an underwriter whose other 
client has a reported accounting irregularity is not significantly related to the long-
term relative stock performance of an SGX-listed Chinese firm.  
 
In Panel B, our dependent variables are Adj_FSSTIi and Adj_FSTASi. The variables 
IR_FSSTIi, IR_FSTASi, IPO_Voli, Scandali, and Underwriteri resulted in the expected 
signs; however, only the coefficient for IPO_Voli is significant.  Similar to Ritter 
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(1991), this implies that firms launch initial public offerings during periods of 
investors’ over-optimism.  The variables Scandali and Underwriteri are both 
insignificant; therefore, based on the results in Panel B of Table 6, having a reported 
accounting irregularity or an underwriter whose other client has a reported accounting 
irregularity is not significantly related to the long-term relative stock performance of a 
Chinese IPO.   
 
Table 11: Multivariate Analysis of the Long-term Cumulative Adjusted Returns and 
Presence of a Reported Accounting Irregularity 
This table presents the results of a multivariate analysis of long-term cumulative adjusted returns and 
the presence of a reported accounting irregularity.  Test variables are set in bold typeface.  Note that p-
values are two-tailed values.  Variables are defined as follows: 
Adj_Controli, Adj_FSSTIi, Adj_FSTASi = the cumulative adjusted return for sample firm i from its 
listing date until its six-year anniversary or December 31, 2011, whichever is earlier, 
calculated using the sample firm’s control firm, the FTSE Straits Times Index, and the FTSE 
ST All Share Index respectively as the benchmark 
IR_FSSTIi, IR_FSTASi = the return of sample firm i on its first day of trading less the return of the 
market on that day, calculated using the the FTSE Straits Times Index and the FTSE ST All 
Share Index respectively as the market proxy 
Log_Agei = the natural logarithm of one plus the age of sample firm i, calculated as the year of 
listing less the year of founding 
IPO_Voli = the number of initial public offerings in the year that the sample firm went public / 100 
Offer_Sizei = the total amount of proceeds raised in the sample firm’s initial offering which is 
calculated by multiplying the number of shares offered and the final offer price 
Scandali = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sample firm was reported in the press to have had 
an accounting irregularity within six years after going public  
Underwriteri = a dummy variable that equals 1 if: (1) the sample firm’s underwriter was also the 
underwriter of another firm that has been reported in the press to have had an accounting 
irregularity within six years from the firm’s listing date; and (2) the accounting irregularity at 
one of the underwriter’s other clients must have been reported within the period for which the 
sample firm’s cumulative market-adjusted return was measured 
Panel A  





Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
IR_FSSTI - 0.0469 0.571 - - 
IR_FSTAS - - - 0.0468 0.572 
Log_Age + -0.0261 0.878 -0.0262 0.878 
IPO_Vol - -0.5419 0.470 -0.5419 0.470 
Offer_Size - 0.0392 0.681 0.0392 0.681 
Scandal - 0.5475 0.285 0.5476 0.285 
Underwriter - -0.2645 0.287 -0.2645 0.287 
Intercept ? -0.6744 0.687 0.6743 0.687 
F-value   0.51 0.780 0.51 0.800 
  









Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
IR_FSSTI - -0.0869 0.132 - - 
IR_FSTAS - - - -0.0872 0.135 
Log_Age + -0.0414 0.726 -0.0376 0.752 
IPO_Vol - -1.0282 0.050 -1.1035 0.038 
Offer_Size - 0.0229 0.729 0.0279 0.676 
Scandal - -0.1554 0.661 -0.1757 0.624 
Underwriter - -0.1466 0.395 -0.1382 0.427 
Intercept ? -0.1783 0.878 -0.2073 0.086 
F-value   1.34 0.244 1.43 0.207 
 
7.4. Prior research on the lack of a long-term impact of accounting 
irregularities on stock price performance  
 
Several other studies also appear to have found no long-term impact on stock price 
performance by reported accounting irregularities.   
 
Davidson and Worrell (1988) did not find any significant cumulative abnormal 
returns for firms reported to have corporate illegalities beyond the date the 
announcement was first released in the press.  They examined time intervals of up to 
ninety days after the first announcement in the press. 
 
Davidson, Worrell, and Lee (1994) found significant cumulative abnormal returns for 
firms with announced blatant corporate illegalities only until the day after the 
announcement was first made in the Wall Street Journal and again from the day 
before until the day after the indictment for charges of criminal fraud.  They examined 
twenty-day periods after both the first announcement of the corporate illegality and 
the date of indictment.   
 55 
 
Similarly, Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) also found that the abnormal returns from 
reports of disputed accounting persisted for only two days each on the first disclosure 
in the press and the disclosure of SEC investigations.  There were no further 
significant abnormal returns found up to five days after the first disclosure to the press 
and after the disclosure of SEC investigations. 
 
7.5. Possible explanations for the lack of significant relationship between the 
presence of a reported accounting irregularity and long-term performance 
 
There are two highly possible scenarios are consistent with our finding of a reported 
accounting irregularity not being significantly related to the long-term relative stock 
performance of a firm.   
 
The first possible scenario is one wherein the contagion effect of an accounting 
irregularity is prevalent.  The contagion effect can manifest due to two reasons.  The 
first reason is that a reported accounting irregularity in one firm signals trouble for 
other similar companies.  Investors may consider the root cause of the accounting 
irregularity to be common across all other similar companies and therefore lower their 
expectations of profitability for all firms in the same category.  (Xu, Najand, & 
Ziegenfuss, 2006)  The second reason is that a reported accounting irregularity can 
cause investors to alter their perceptions of the accounting quality of all other firms 
with the same characteristics as the implicated firm.  (Gleason, Jenkins, & Johnson, 
2008)  Investors’ perception of the accounting quality of firms with the same business 
environments, auditors, or underwriters may become lower than before.  Lower 
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expected profitability and perception of accounting quality would cause the stock 
prices of similar firms to fall with that of the implicated firm.   
 
Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) found evidence of the contagion effect in a 
sample of 919 restatements between 1997 and 2002.  Accounting restatements which 
resulted in lower share prices for the restating firm were associated with small but 
statistically significant share price declines among non-restating peer firms; moreover, 
the price decline among peer firms appears to be unrelated to changes in analysts’ 
forecasts which were used as proxy for altered expectations of future profitability.   
 
Applying the contagion effect in the context of our study, a reported accounting 
irregularity in one Chinese firm may signal to investors the problem of weak 
corporate governance.  Investors may then consider weak corporate governance to be 
common across most, if not all, Chinese companies.  They may therefore lower their 
expectations of profitability for Chinese firms and also reassess and lower their 
perception of accounting quality across all Chinese companies.  Investors’ lower 
expectations of profitability and perception of accounting quality will translate to 
lower returns for all Chinese firms, regardless of whether they were directly 
implicated in a reported accounting irregularity.  Such a scenario will render the 
coefficients of our test variables Scandali and Underwriteri insignificant. 
 
The second possible scenario is that firms with reported accounting irregularities were 
able to restore investors’ trust by improving their corporate governance and therefore 
have been able to recover their share prices to what they should be had the accounting 
irregularity not been discovered and reported.  Farber (2005) found that firms that 
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committed financial fraud were able to improve their corporate governance to levels 
comparable to their peer firms within three years after the fraud detection.  Firms that 
improved their corporate governance structures after fraud detection were also able to 
recover their share values; they experienced positive and economically significant 
long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the three-year period following fraud 
detection.  (Farber, 2005)   
 
If the firms in our sample also improved their corporate governance structures within 
our sample period after the report of an accounting irregularity, their stock prices 
would have also recovered.  The stock price decline from the initial report of the 
accounting irregularity would have been reversed, and the report of the accounting 
irregularity would not have a significant effect on its long-term relative stock price 
performance.  The coefficients of our test variables Scandali and Underwriteri would 





The significant presence of Chinese firms on SGX make it worthwhile to examine 
whether investors earn more returns from investing in Chinese firms compared to 
investing in comparable local firms.  Investors can potentially earn more returns from 
investing in Chinese firms as it gives them access to the large profit potential in the 
rapidly growing economy of China.  However, the many accounting scandals erupting 
in Chinese firms have undermined investor confidence and caused declines in these 
firms’ stock prices.  To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine 
empirically the returns made by investors from investing in Chinese firms listed on 
SGX vis-à-vis investing in comparable local firms. 
 
Our sample consists of all Chinese firms that listed on SGX from 2002 to 2011.  We 
examine the cumulative average abnormal returns of our portfolio of sample Chinese 
firms as calculated against the abovementioned benchmarks.  We focus on long-term 
performance of up to three years after listing.  As the cumulative average abnormal 
returns over three years of our sample portfolio are significantly negative, we 
therefore conclude that investing of Chinese firms on SGX yields less return for 
investors compared to investing in comparable local firms.   
 
We further test the robustness of our results against the established anomaly of IPO 
long-term underperformance by comparing the returns from investing in a portfolio of 
Chinese firms with the returns from a portfolio of the most recently listed local firms 




We also control for home bias and compare the returns of our sample portfolio of 
Chinese firms against the returns of a portfolio of most recently listed foreign non-
Chinese firms.  There appears to be no significant difference between the returns of 
these two portfolios, which implies that our earlier results are being driven by home 
bias.  However, we must interpret this result with caution, as the lack of significant 
difference could potentially be due to the very small sample size of twenty-eight firms. 
 
We also examine whether the presence of a reported accounting irregularity is 
significantly related on average to the long-term underperformance of an SGX-listed 
Chinese firm.  In our regression of the Chinese firms’ cumulative abnormal returns 
versus a dummy variable indicating the presence of a reported accounting irregularity, 
we find the coefficient of the said dummy variable insignificant.  This lack of a 
significant relationship may be due to the contagion effect whereby all Chinese firms 
would have suffered significantly negative returns, as investors perceive the root 
cause of the reported accounting irregularity to be common across all Chinese firms.  
It may also be due to substantial improvements in the implicated firms’ corporate 
governance, which could have restored investors’ confidence in the firms and 
consequently the firms’ stock prices. 
 
Future research can perhaps examine more closely the reason why Chinese firms 
listed on SGX underperform other recently listed local comparable firms.  One avenue 
worth exploring is the adverse selection problem for SGX as Chinese firms seem to 
prefer listing in Hong Kong and will only come to Singapore for listing when it 
knows it will not be able to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Future research 
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can also examine the lack of a significant relationship between long-term performance 
and the presence of a reported accounting irregularity for our sample of SGX-listed 
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